[Notice] Response to the Private Key Compromise of eMudhra (emSign) Intermediate CAs
It has been reported that the private keys of intermediate CAs of the certificate authority eMudhra (emSign) were compromised. The compromised keys can be used to issue fraudulent certificates for any domain. Clients whose root store includes emSign ECC Root CA - G3 or AAA Certificate Services may accept such certificates, which could allow their communications to be intercepted or tampered with.
On PFCP, we have updated the cluster nodes and components so that they no longer trust these roots.
Mitigation
- Updated the
ca-certificatespackage on the nodes of all clusters at all sites. - Stopped trusting these roots when pulling container images.
Completion Time
October 21, 2026, 17:00 JST
Customer Action Required
The mitigation on the PFCP side is complete. However, root stores inside container images are managed by customers. For workloads that connect to destinations on the internet over TLS, please take the following actions.
- Update the
ca-certificatespackage in your images (e.g., 20260816ubuntu0.24.04.1 or later on Ubuntu 24.04). - Runtimes and libraries that ship their own root store, such as Python
certifi, Javacacerts, and Node.js, are not fixed by updating OS packages. Update each of them to a fixed version. As of this notice, no fixed version of Node.js has been released.
The MN-Core SDK images have been fixed in MN-Core SDK 0.9.1, a hotfix release for 0.9. For details, refer to the notice about the MN-Core SDK images.
References
- Mozilla Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2083449
- https://emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com/
PFCP is committed to providing timely security updates so that our users can continue to use our services with confidence.
